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ABSTRACT

In 2008, the Utah Supreme Court held that the public right to recreational
use of water includes the right to incidentally contact privately owned beds of
waterways. The court's decision ignited controversy, and the Utah legislature
responded emphatically with a new public ownership statute nulifying the
court's holding. The statute's supportersconcluded, not entirely without reason,
that public ownership of 'Utah'swaters arises solely from the Utah Code. If this
reasoning is sound, it follows that the legislature was free to correct the judicial
interpretationwith which it disagreed. But, it is not altogetherclear that public
ownership of Utah's waters is purely statutory. Judicial precedent and
constitutionalhistory suggest that an alternative, independent legal basisfor the
public ownership of Utah's waters exists. The purpose of this article is thus to
shed light on the origins of public ownership in Utah water law, and to assess
the potential implicationsfor the constitutionality of the new public ownership
statute.
INTRODUCTION

The constitutions of most western states provide for public
ownership of water. However, the Utah Constitution is exceptional in
* Assistant Attorney General, Wyoming Office of the Attorney General, Water and
Natural Resources Division. I am grateful to Robert Adler for inspiring this research
and to Peter Michael for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Opinions
and errors are mine alone.
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this regard because it does not clearly assert public ownership of water.
Instead, article XVII of the Utah Constitution provides only.that "[a]ll
existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful
or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."'
Nevertheless, Utah courts have long recognized public ownership as
an element of Utah water law. 2
In most areas of water use, Utah and other western states apply the
public ownership concept similarly - by common law and statutes
that flesh out how the public water resource may be put to private use
for the benefit of society.' For example, western water law generally
allows individuals to divert publicly owned waters for private
agricultural use.' While private agricultural use of publicly owned
water has deep historical roots, public recreational use of water is a
subject of more recent concern.
The issue of public use of water for recreational purposes came to
the fore only recently, for obvious reasons - namely, western settlers
focused on water use for survival and basic industry, not whitewater
rafting and fly-fishing. By the end of the twentieth century, however,
most western states had addressed the extent to which public
ownership of water includes public rights of access to watercourses for
recreational purposes such as fishing, boating, and hunting. The
Colorado Supreme Court, for example, concluded that even though
the Colorado Constitution provides that the water of every stream is
public property dedicated to the use of the people,' the right of public
ownership does not include the right to float and fish on nonnavigable waterways.' In contrast, the supreme courts of other western
states, including Wyoming, Montana, and New Mexico, have
concluded that the constitutional provision for public ownership of
water does include the right to float and fish on non-navigable waters.'
These deeply divergent views on whether public ownership of water
includes rights to recreational access help to illustrate the complex
and controversial nature of the issues. Some states, such as Wyoming,
have essentially settled the debate.' But the battle rages on in other
states.9
1. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
2. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir, & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah
1937).
3. See e.g., I WELLS A. HUTCHINS, COMPLETED BY HAROLD H. ELLIS & PETER DEBRAAL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 5 (2004).

4. See e.g., id. at 17.
5.
6.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979).

7. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961); Montana Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); New Mexico v. Red River
Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 430-34 (N.M. 1945) (rejecting the reasoning of the Colorado
Supreme Court).
8. Day, 362 P.2d at 147.

9. In Montana, for example, the 1984 Montana Supreme Court decision in Curran
did not ultimately settle the issue; instead the fight continues. See Michael Babcock,
Anglers Anxious Bill Would Cut Stream Access, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Feb. 10, 2011; Pat
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Utah first faced the question of whether public ownership of water
gives rise to rights to recreational access in 1982.o Borrowing from the
law of Wyoming, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a right to
recreational access exists incident to public ownership of water." At
the time, however, the Utah Supreme Court reserved the question of
whether the public recreational access right includes the right to touch
privately owned streambeds.12 That question materialized nearly three
decades later; in a highly controversial opinion, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the tight of recreational access inherent in public
ownership of water includes the right to incidentally touch privately
owned beds of waterways."
Private owners of riparian property and the Utah legislature
reacted emphatically to this holding, declaring the court's opinion
null and void through a new public ownership statute - the Utah
Public Waters Access Act (HB- 141)." The supporters of the bill
asserted, not entirely without reason, that public ownership of Utah's
waters arises solely from a statutory provision in the Utah code.'" If
this reasoning was sound, it follows that the legislature was free to
correct the judicial interpretation with which it disagreed.
However, it is not altogether clear that public ownership of Utah
water rests solely on a statutory foundation. Judicial precedent and
constitutional history suggest that an alternative, independent legal
basis for public ownership of Utah's waters exists. While Utah courts
have repeatedly alluded to public ownership independent of statutory
authority, explanations of the legal basis therefor are limited. The
Utah Supreme Court has referred to a "doctrine of public ownership,"
explaining the concept in terms of prior appropriation and natural
law.1 But, Utah courts have not identified the doctrine's precise legal
origin. As a result, the state of the law is uncertain. This uncertainty
has ripened in the form of a constitutional challenge to HB 141 that
will likely require the Utah courts to determine whether the doctrine
Munday, Montana Puts Limits on National Trout Unlimited, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 16,
3
2007, http://www.hcn.org/issues/3 4 4 /16 9 5 . And, even though the Colorado
the issue of public recreational access
on
Supreme Court has spoken authoritatively
rights deriving from public ownership of water, debate over the subject has not ended.
See Jimy Valenti, Rafting Bill Sent Upstreamfor More Study, COLO. STATESMAN, Mar. 19,
2010,
http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991683-rafting-bill-sent-upstream-morestudy; Lori Potter et al., Legal Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property
in Colorado:A Reply tojohn Hill, 5 U. DENVER WATER L. REv. 457 (2002).
10. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
11. Id. at 1137.
12. Id. at 1139.
13. Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 903 (Utah 2008).
14. HB 141 (Utah 2010). The ownership provision is codified as paragraphs (2)
through (4) of the public ownership statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (West
2010).
15. FloorDebate on House Bill 141: Recreational Use of Public Water on Private Property,
Utah H.R., Feb. 22, 2010 (statement of Rep. McIff) [hereinafter McIff], available at
http://e.utah.gov/-2010/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HBO141.htm
16. Conatser 194 P.3d at 899.
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of public ownership has roots in the Utah Constitution.' 7
This article thus aims to shed light on the origins of public
ownership in Utah water law, and to assess the potential implications
for the constitutionality of HB 141. The discussion begins with an
overview of the evolution of the public recreational easement in Utah
water law, examining first the Conatser decision and its predecessors,
and then proceeding to the passage and substance of HB 141. This
article then analyzes potential sources of public ownership law,
including statutory declarations, judicial interpretations, prior
appropriation doctrine, and Utah Constitution article XVII.
Several propositions become evident from analysis of these legal
sources. First, article XVII of the Utah Constitution does not expressly
provide for public ownership. Rather, it only preserves the status quo
ante for water rights existing at the time of statehood. Second, article
XVII protects water rights established according to Utah prior
appropriation law. And third, public ownership has inhered in Utah's
water appropriation law since territorial times. From these premises,
this article argues that article XVII provides for public ownership, even
if only as a component of the existing water rights system that the Utah
Constitution preserves.
Whether the water amendment to the Utah Constitution provides
for public ownership of water is a debatable point. The text of article
XVII is not rich in meaning, and countervailing historical arguments
concerning its interpretation exist. The weight of the evidence
suggests that public ownership has always been a component of Utah
water law. Yet the drafters of the Utah Constitution rejected a water
amendment that expressly provided for public ownership.
Concluding that public ownership of water arises from the Utah
constitution implicates serious questions concerning the validity of HB
141. Interpreting the meaning of constitutional provisions, such as
whether public ownership of water entails a right to recreational
access, as well as the nature and extent of that right, undoubtedly falls
within the province of the judiciary. Nonetheless, HB 141 purports to
usurp this judicial authority, replacing the Utah Supreme Court's
interpretation with that of the legislature. Accordingly, this article
closes with an analysis of the separation of powers implications that
follow from concluding that public ownership of Utah water has roots
in the Utah Constitution.
I. THE PUBLIC EASEMENT IN WATER

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a public recreational
17. See Complaint at 18, Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Victory Ranch, L.C. (4th Jud.
Dist. Ct. of Utah 2010) [hereinafter Coalition Complaint], availableat
http://utahstreamaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/RY8657.pdf.
(alleging
that HB 141 violates public rights and the constitutional separation of powers). Also
see Roxanna Orellana & Peter S. Lozancich, Group Sues over Stream Access, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/50666012-76/access-publicutah-act.html.csp.
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right incident to public ownership of water. Many other states
recognize similar rights," but the recreational easement, as it is
understood in Utah, has become a controversial subject in the state's
water law. The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the easement in
a 1982 case involving a corporation's attempt to convert a public water
body into a private fishery. However, the 1982 decision left open the
question of whether the easement burdened the beds underlying
public waters. That question ripened almost thirty years later, and
Utah's high court concluded that the public easement granted the
public license to incidentally contact privately owned streambeds while
utilizing public waters.' 9 Controversy followed the decision, and the
Utah legislature responded- with a statute to overrule the court's
interpretation of the law. Opponents have now challenged the statute,
raising questions concerning the constitutional separation of powers.
A. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the public recreational
easement in water in the 1982 case of J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Division of
Wildlife Resources.20 In that case a corporation, which owned all of the
land surrounding a natural lake, challenged the state's denial of its
application to operate a private fishery on the lake." The state
asserted that the lake was navigable and, therefore, a public trust
property that the company could not convert into a private fishery."
The court held, however, that "[allthough 'navigability' is a standard
used to determine title to waterbeds, it does not establish the extent of
the State's interest in the waters."
Refusing to dispose of the case on public trust grounds, the court
instead assessed the claims in light of public ownership of water. In
Utah, like most states west of the Mississippi River, public ownership of
water is the rule.2 ' The JJ.N.P. court began its analysis of public
ownership with a reference to the Utah Code provision on public
ownership, which provides that "all waters ... are the property of the
public." The court then went on to explain that "public ownership is
18. See, e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961); S. Idaho Fish &
Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho 1974); New Mexico
v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 434 (N.M. 1945); Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W.
622, 626 (N.D. 1921); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936); Hillebrand
v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937); Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Wash.
1956).
19. Conatser,194 P.3d at 903.
20. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).
21. Id.at1135.
22. Id. at 1136.
23. Id. (citing Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946); Comment, Basis for the
Legal Establishment of a Public Right of Recreation in Utah's "Non-Navigable" Waters, 5 J.
CONTEMP. L. 95 (1978)).
24. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1).
25. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; WYo. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2010).
26. J.JN.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
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founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in
this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the
people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of
allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of
The legal corollary to this principle of
the State as a whole.""
necessity is what the JJ.N.P. court described as the "doctrine of public
ownership."" However, the JJ.N.P. court did not clearly define the
source of the public ownership doctrine. The court described the
doctrine in terms of natural law, citing to Blackstone, and as a
necessary incident to prior appropriation. 9
One can understand the court's failure to more precisely explain
this doctrine of public ownership, because regardless of the source,
public ownership of water is settled Utah law.so Utah courts have long
understood that the state serves as trustee of the water and regulates its
use in protection of the public interest. Public ownership provides
the basis for the state to regulate water for the good of the people."
Only waters taken into physical possession by placement in storage
receptacles may be privately owned." All other waters are the property
of the public; all are equal owners, with coequal rights, and no one can
have exclusive control thereof.'
B. PUBLIC RIGHTS
As an incident to public ownership, the Utah Supreme Court
explained in JJ.N.P., the public holds an easement over the water
"regardless of who owns the water beds beneath."" Accordingly, the
public does not trespass when utilizing publicly owned waters, even
where such water is flowing over privately owned lands." Interpreting
the scope of the easement, the court concluded that "the public, if it
can obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure
craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing
that water."" But, the J.JN.P. court left open the question of whether
the public easement burdens privately owned beds of waterways,
rendering the actual scope of the easement highly uncertain. 8
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1136 n.3.
30. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672, 677
(Utah 1902).
31. Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 966-67 (Utah 1943).
32. J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)).
33. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir, & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah
1937) (describing an ownership rule of capture).
34. Id.
35. JJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
.36. Id. at 1136-37.
37. Id. at 1137 (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961); S. Idaho
Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho 1974)). The
court also notes a long list of other states that have found a public right to recreational
use of public waters. See fJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 n.4.
38. Id. at 1138 n.6.
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That uncertainty came to the fore nearly thirty years later in
Conatser v. Johnson.3" The Conatsers were recreational users of the
Weber River, who appear to have had a long running dispute
concerning the scope of the public easement with the Johnsons,
owners of property riparian to the Weber.40 The Johnsons eventually
notified the sheriff, who arrested the Conatsers for trespass based on
their contact with the Johnsons' privately owned riverbeds." The trial
court convicted the Conatsers, but on appeal the state dropped its case
due to "uncertainty regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers. "42
Desiring a resolution to the long running conflict, the Conatsers filed
an action seeking a declaration of their rights to the river. 3 They
argued that the public easement to utilize the waters allows for nonobtrusive touching of the privately owned steam beds." The District
Court rejected this argument, concluding that the easement only
allows members of the public to be upon the water and to touch the
beds and banks incidental to flotation.4 5
The Utah Supreme Court, however, saw the matter differently.
Rejecting the District Court's reliance on the Wyoming case of Day v.
Armstrong, the high Utah court pointed out that J.JN.P. had subtly
departed from the holding in Day.4 6 The Day court concluded that
recreational rights to access publicly owned waters were derivative of
the right to float, and thus the easement allowed only activities "upon"
the water.4 ' But, the Utah Supreme Court noted J.JN.P. did not adopt
the same limiting language." Rather, JJN.P. found an easement to
"utilize" -the water, not merely to be upon it.4" Thus, the question
reserved by the /J.N.P. court - whether the easement reached the
beds of waterways - was not so easily disposed of as the trial court
concluded.
Looking to the law of easements, the Utah Supreme Court in
Conatser explained that an easement holder is privileged "to. do such
acts as are necessary to make effective his or her enjoyment of the

39. Conatser v.Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 897 (Utah 2008).
40. Id. at 898-99.
41. Id. According to the record, the Conatsers contacted the river bottom in four
ways: their raft occasionally made contact in shallow areas; their raft paddles
occasionally touched bottom; fishing tackle occasionally touched bottom; and Mr.
Conatser walked on the bed to fish and remove fencing the Johnsons installed across
the river. Id.
42. Id. at 899.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Accordingly, the trial court found that Mr. Conatser's act of walking on the
river bottom while fishing constituted a trespass. Id.
46. Id. at 901.
47. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 144 (Wyo. 1961).
48. See Conatser, 194 P.3d at 901. In fact, it is unclear why the Day court found it
necessary to limit the public easement to activities incident to navigation, especially
since the court expressly refused to resolve the case based on navigability. See Day, 362
P.2d at 143-44.
49. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).
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easement."o But the rights of the dominant and servient estates are
"limited, each by the other, that there may be a due and reasonable
enjoyment of both."" Applying these general easement principles to
the public easement in water, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that
members of the public may engage in all lawful activities that utilize
the water, including coming into contact with privately owned
submerged lands, so long as the activities are conducted reasonably,
and in a way that does not cause unnecessary injury to the servient
estate.
The effect of the Conatserdecision was to make certain the public
right to incidentally touch beds of waters that do not meet the
traditional test for navigability-in-fact. Under Utah law, beds to waters
that were navigable in fact at the time of statehood are owned by the
state in trust for the public." A watercourse is considered navigable if,
in its natural state at the time of statehood, it was available as a public
highway for practical, valuable, commercial purposes.5 ' Beds to
navigable waterways, then, are owned by the public and openly
available to public recreational use irrespective of the public
recreational easement. Watercourses that were not navigable-in-fact at
the time of statehood, on the other hand, are not subject to the public
trust, and the beds thereof may be privately owned." Those privately
owned -beds of small streams and rivers are the estates that the
recreational easement burdens.
C. HOUSE BILL 141
Not surprisingly, the Conatser decision generated mixed reactions.
While the case dealt a monumental victory to public recreational
interests, it raised fears of trespassing and declining property values for
riparian property owners. 6 Now, every stream or river reach that does
not meet the navigable-in-fact test for public ownership, many of which
flow through highly valuable residential property, would be opened up
to public use. Given the vagueness of the -Conatser standards "reasonable use" and "unnecessary injury" - as well as the high
transaction costs that would accompany prosecuting, for example,
small scale littering, property owners argued that the Conatser decision
disposed of what were seemingly settled investment-backed property
expectations.
50. Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902.
51. Id. (citing Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah
1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See id.
53. See Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759, 760 (Utah 1946).
54. See id. at 761.
55. See id. at 760.
56. See Randy Parker, Op-Ed., Balance PropertyRights, Recreation, DESERET NEWS, Mar.
10, 2010, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700015272/Balance-property-rightsrecreation.html.
57. AmyJoi O'Donoghue, Gov. HerbertSigns Bill RestrictingAccess to Streams on Private
Property, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010 (noting the perception that Conatser "gutted"
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The Utah legislature took up the riparian owners' cause, and in
the first week of February 2010, Utah Representative Kay McIff
introduced House Bill 141 (HB 141), also known as the Utah Public
Waters Access Act. The Bill railed against the Conatser decision,
declaring it to be a violation of Utah's constitutional protection against
uncompensated takings of private property."
Nevertheless,
Representative McIff explained on the house floor that HB 141 was
"not intended as an attack on the Supreme Court."" McIff went on to
assert that the "good news is the [Conatser] court did not rely upon any
constitutional provisions; there's [sic] no constitutional analysis; it
relied on a statute; the legislature can deal with statutes; it can clarify
and amend."'
Therefore, McIff concluded, the legislature could
undo the Conatser decision without violating the constitutional
separation of powers.
The bill passed both houses of the legislature, and in late March
2010 Utah Governor Gary Herbert signed HB 141 into law. The bill
amended the Utah statute on public ownership of water, providing
that the declaration of public ownership "does not create or recognize
an easement for public recreational use on private property. "61 HB
141 asserted further that "The Legislature shall govern the use of
public water for beneficial purposes, "6' again noting a concern for
constitutional protections for private property. In rejecting the
Conatser decision, HB 141 did not do away with the public easement
altogether. Instead, it essentially substituted the reasoning of the
Conatser trial court decision and Day v. Armstrong for that of the Utah
Supreme Court, declaring that the public easement allows only
touching of streambeds incidental to flotation."
Like the Conatser decision, HB 141's passage into law received
mixed reviews. Riparian property owners praised the bill as a
restoration of their private property rights,'
whereas water
recreationists saw it as a devastating blow to public rights."5
II. THE LEGAL ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

Riparian property owners may have found relief in the legislature,
but Utah's stream wars continue. In November 2010, recreational
property rights), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700020962/Gov-Herbert-signsbill-restricting-access-to-streams-on-private-property.html.
58. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103 (2010).
59. McIff, supra note 15.
60. Id.
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2011).
62. Id.
63. See id. § 73-29-202.
64. See, e.g., Opinion, Ask Permission,SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 9, 2010,
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/49373875-82/utah-bill-anglers-ask.htm.csp
(describing HB 141 as leveling the playing field for riparian owners).
65. See Opinion, Guv's Bad Decision, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 2, 2010,
http://www.sitrib.com/strib/opinion/49335333-82/outdoor-utah-decisionquality.html.csp.
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water users filed suit asking the judiciary to invalidate HB 141, arguing
that the law violates public rights in water and the constitutional
separation of powers.66 The challenge to the validity of the Utah
Public Waters Access Act raises complex questions about the legal
origins of public ownership of water in Utah. As supporters of HB 141
will be quick to point out, the Utah Code provides for public
ownership. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the Code is not the only legal authority for public
ownership, often referring also to the "doctrine of public ownership."
Unfortunately, Utah courts have been vague about the precise legal
origin of this independent, alternative basis for public ownership.
Teasing out the meaning of the doctrine of public ownership
requires a careful review of the history of public ownership in Utah
water law. The analysis begins at the most certain point - the Utah
Code - which expressly declares public ownership of water. Next,
this paper examines the judicial expressions of an independent
alternative basis. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court understood public
ownership to be the rule even before the enactment of the public
ownership statute, describing public ownership in terms of prior
appropriation doctrine and natural law. The Utah Constitution also
expresses these concepts, raising questions about whether the
independent basis for public ownership of Utah water is, in fact,
constitutional. The authorities suggest that the case for public
ownership of water finds traction in Utah Constitution article XVII's
protection of the water rights status quo at the time of statehood. The
evidence is not conclusive, however, and countervailing arguments
exist.
A. STATUTORY AuTHoRITY
The Utah Code provides for the public ownership of water, stating
that "all waters ...

are hereby declared to be the property of the

public."" This provision traces its roots to the 1903 irrigation bill,'
and its language remains essentially unchanged today." The 1903 bill,
which many contemporary observers believed to be the most
important legislation of the session,o aimed to resolve the
enforcement problems and according uncertainties that were

66. See Coalition Complaint, supra note 17, at 15.
67. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1(1) (West 2011).
68. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 47. Interestingly, Westlaw traces the current
codification of the public ownership statute to a 1919 law, which in fact inherited the
provision from the 1903 irrigation bill,
69. See id. The 1903 bill provided as follows: "The waters of all streams and other
sources in this State, whether flowing above or underground, in known or defined
channels, is [sic] hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof."
70. See, e.g., Legislature in Expiring Throes, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 14, 1903, at 1
(describing the irrigation bill as "[t]he most important piece of legislation that has
been enacted"); Gov. Urges Passageof IrrigationBil4 DESERET NEws, Mar. 9, 1903, at 1.
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In addition to
wreaking havoc on Utah water supply management.'
of water 72
control
centralized
for
bill
provided
the
public ownership,
and forfeiture of water rights for non-use. The bill faced insignificant
opposition and generated little relevant debate.7 4
That the bill faced little opposition is remarkable because less than
a decade earlier, similar public ownership language proposed for the
One possible
Utah Constitution gave rise to staunch opposition.
explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that in 1903 the state of
water supply management was more objectionable than it was a decade
earlier, and that a majority of the public believed comprehensive
It may also be that the 1903 public
legislation was the solution.
ownership provision was included as an unexamined piece of
legislation borrowed from another jurisdiction." Another explanation
for the disparity may lie in a subtle semantic distinction between the
proposed constitutional amendment and the 1903 irrigation bill. The
proposed constitutional text provided that.all waters would be the
property of the "State,"7 whereas the irrigation bill declared the
Had the public ownership
waters to belong to the "public."7 '
provision in the 1903 irrigation bill stimulated more debate, some
insight might have been gleaned as to the legislature's understanding
71. Prior to 1903, county courts served as the forum for water rights disputes.
However, county lines restrained jurisdiction, which normally contained only segments
of water sources. See Rights of Water Owners: Important Case Heard in the Court at Fillmore,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 15, 1897, at 7. As a result, inconsistent decrees became the
norm, and the jurisdictionally constrained focus of county court judges led to decrees
far in excess of supplies. See, e.g., UTAH IRRIGATION COMM'N, IRRIGATION IN UTAH 96
(1894) ("How then, shall we rank him, who, by judicial fiat alone, can cause 800
inches of water to run where Nature only put 100 inches?"). Uncertainty over water
supplies persisted and litigation was widespread. See, e.g., Water Famine Near: Mrs. Dudler
Takes Half of Parley's Creek Flow, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 25, 1898, at 8; Big IrrigationSuit,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 23, 1897, at 1; Southern Utah Water Famine, SALT LAKE TRIB., May
4, 1896, at 8.
72. 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 1 (granting broad administrative authority to state
water engineer). See also id.§ 35 (establishing a permit system).
73. See id. § 50.
74. See Big IrrigationBill Is Passed, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 11, 1903, at 1 (noting
widespread support and minimal opposition in the legislature). Opposition to the bill
focused primarily on the cost of administration and central versus local control. See
Opposed to Bill: American Fork Men Don't Like Irrigation Measure, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar.
6, 1903, at 7. The support the bill received from newspaper editors is also noteworthy.
'See, e.g., The IrrigationQuestion, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 2, 1903, at 5; Pass the Joint Irrigation
Bill, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 1, 1903, at 12.
75. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
76. See Solons Asked to Legislate, SALT LAKE HERALD, Feb. 18, 1903, at 2 (asserting that
comprehensive legislation was best way to remedy the system). The proponent cites
Wyoming as a model. Ironically, Wyoming served as the model for the language
rejected from the constitution. See The IrrigationArticle, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 11, 1895,
at 3.
77. See Solons, supra note 76. Public ownership did come up in debate over another
water bill. See Ogden Water Was in Senate, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 5, 1903, at 5.
However, the issue there was not so much public ownership as municipal power to
condemn water rights. See id.
78. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
79. 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 47.
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of the origins of public ownership in Utah water law. Instead, it is
uncertain whether the legislature believed that the public ownership
provision in the 1903 irrigation bill implemented new law, codified
common law, or enacted law pursuant to the constitution.
The passage of the 1903 irrigation bill, though significant, was not
the only important water policy event in Utah that year. Six months
after the irrigation bill passed, the Eleventh National Irrigation
Congress convened in Ogden, Utah."o Though not bearing directly on
Utah legislation, the proceedings in Ogden shed some light on
professional understandings of public ownership of water at the time.
Moreover, the meetings may also say something about the Utah
legislators' understanding of public ownership. More than one-fifth of
the Utah legislators who voted for the irrigation bill were among the
official delegates to the Irrigation Congress." Utah Senator David
McKay, a leader in Utah water law," helped to organize the
convention." The meaning to be derived from the proceedings may
be limited, however, because the recently passed Utah public
ownership law was not mentioned once on the record."
That is not to say that public ownership was not a prominent
theme in the proceedings. In fact, the delegates discussed public
ownership of water both as a general theoretical proposition and as an
aspect of Utah water management. George H. Maxwell, the Executive
Chairman of the Congress, for example, introduced a resolution,
which a majority of the delegates later adopted," declaring that public
ownership of water is the ideal." Another speaker explained the

80. The'annual irrigation congress meetings received widespread press and were
among the most significant events of the day. The first meeting, held in Salt Lake City
in 1891, was later described as the first time that Mormons and Gentiles "joined hands
with equal enthusiasm and in utter forgetfulness of the differences of the past."
William E. Smythe, The Influence of Irrigation on the American Ideal, in OFFICIAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH NATIONAL IRRIGATION CONGRESS: HELD AT OGDEN, UTAH,
SEPTEMBER 15-18, 1903, 182, 188-89 (Gilbert McClurg ed., 1904) (hereinafter 11TH
IRRIGATION]. More than 1,200 delegates from thirty states and two foreign nations
attended the 1903 Congress, including noteworthy leaders like Chief Forester Pinchot
and Chief Engineer Newell. 11TH IRRIGATION, at 107,124.
81. See id. at 117-22. See also Utah State Legislature, Utah State Legislators: Session
1903, http://le.utah.gov/asp/roster/roster.aspyear=1903 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
Senators serving as delegates included John M. Barnes, Henry Gardner, and Joseph R.
Murdock. Delegate representatives included George H. Adams, John C. Child,
Stephen L. Chipman, Asa R. Hawley, Archibald McFarland, Robert McKinnon, and
David R. Roberts.
82. McKay was considered to be an expert in Utah irrigation. See, e.g., Talked of
IrrigationLaw: joint Session of Legislative Committees, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 20, 1896, at 8
(noting that Sen. McKay presided over discussion of irrigation issues); see also Ogden
Water Was in Senate, supra note 777 (reporting on Sen. McKay debating water policy).
83. See 11TH IRRIGATION, supra note 80, at 5, 13.
84. See generally id. However, Nevada's public ownership law was discussed in detail.
See A.E. Chandler, The IrrigationLaws of Nevada, in 11TH IRRIGATION, supra note 80, at
411,412.
85. 11TH IRRIGATION, sup-a note 80, at 220. No Utah delegate opposed the
resolution. Id. at 226-27.
86. Id. at 79.

UTAH PUBLIC WATERS ACCESS ACT

Issue 2

327

importance of the "rights of the public in the control and disposal of
public water supplies."" Although indicative of general support for
the policy of public ownership, these facts say little about the legal
origins of public ownership of Utah water.
William E. Smythe, a leading thinker on irrigation and former
president of the irrigation congress," spoke specifically of public
ownership of water in Utah, shedding some light on its origins.'
Prophetically, he explained to the convention the story of Utah's
founders:
Standing there by the banks of City creek, in the midst of a boundless
extent of rich but arid soil, they asked themselves this question: "In a
place

like

this, where land

is worthless without

application of moisture, who should own the water -

the artificial

who should

own the melting snow and the bubbling brook?

The life of every man, woman and child in the party depended upon
the answer.... If water in an arid land is property subject to private

ownership, then the men having the strength or capital to take
possession of that stream have the right to dictate the terms upon
which their fellowmen should live.90

Smythe continued, "What then was City creek?"" He answered
that "to the everlasting credit of the Mormon pioneers,"92 they
recognized the public importance of water for survival in an arid land,
and that each has a right in such a vital resource.
What bearing the convention proceedings have on the Utah
Legislature's understanding of the public ownership provision in the
1903 irrigation bill is subject to argument. The widespread emphasis
on the importance of public ownership may help to further explain
why that portion of the irrigation bill passed without debate. William
E. Smythe's account, however, suggests that some sense of public
ownership of Utah water traces its origins back further than the 1903
bill. Even so, courts have repeatedly referred to the public ownership
statute as legal authority for public ownership of Utah water." The

87. Morris Bien, Relation of Federal and State Laws to Irrigation, in 11TH IRRIGATION,
supra note 80, at 397, 399.
88. San Diego History Ctr., William Ellsworth Smythe (1861-1922),
http://www.sandiegohistory.org/bio/smythe/smythe.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
Smythe once astutely noted that "there never was, there is not now, and there never
will be plenty of water." Smythe, supra note 80, at 187.
89. Smythe, supra note 80, at 182.
90. Id. at 186.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755, 767 (Utah 1935);J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah
Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982); Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d
897, 899 n.2 (Utah 2008).
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sponsor of HB 141 even noted this fact when voicing his support for
the bill."
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

The Utah Supreme Court's water law jurisprudence is consistent
with William Smythe's account, which suggests that there may be more
to the story of public ownership than simple statutory declarations. In
February 1902, more than a year before the legislature declared public
ownership of water, Utah's highest court expressly understood the
public to own naturally flowing waters."
The theme of public
ownership of water independent of statutory authority appears also not
long after the legislative codification. In 1925, for example, the Utah
Supreme Court explained that "[u]nder the statute, and before its
enactment, it is and was settled doctrine in arid and semiarid sections of
our country that the corpus of the water of a natural stream was not
subject to private ownership but was the property of the public."9 7 In
Riordan v. Westwood, Justice Wolfe reiterated this principle by stating
that all unappropriated waters of the state "are, and have always been,
public waters."
Interpreting the statutory declaration of public
ownership when it was expanded to groundwater in the 1950s, the
Utah Supreme Court again affirmed its belief in an independent,
alternative basis for public ownership, asserting that public ownership
of ground water "has probably always been the law of this state." 9
The source of this independent basis for public ownership is a
point on which Utah courts have not been clear. In Oldroyd, for
example, the court simply asserted "[w]e all know" that public
ownership is "settled doctrine."'o The Salt Lake Water & Elec. Power
Co. court provided more support for its argument, basing its assertion
of an independent basis for public ownership on prior appropriation
principles.'o' Justice Wolfe's separate opinion in Riordan elaborates
upon this idea of public ownership as a necessary condition for prior
appropriation.o 2 He explained that "the legislature at various times
concerned itself with different categories of public waters by extending
to them certain statutory requirements in order to appropriate said
waters."' Justice Wolfe went on:

95. See McIff, supra note 15.
96. See Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672, 677
(Utah 1902) (explaining that unappropriated water belongs coequally to the public
and remains so until capture in artificial ditches or reservoirs). This same case
supported the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in J..N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
97. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 235 P. 580, 584 (Utah 1925) (emphasis added).
98. Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922, 932 (Utah 1949) (Wolfe, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
99. Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 247 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1952).
100. Oldroyd, 235 P. at 584.
101. See Salt Lake Water & Elec. Power Co, 67 P. at 677.
102. See Riordan,203 P.2d at 932.
103. Id.
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The legislature did not, by a declaration, make public what were
previously non-public waters. It simply extended to all public waters
the necessity of application to the state engineer in order to
They were always public until appropriated by
appropriate....
diligence or by application when the latter was made the necessary
method of appropriation.o 4

Justice Wolfe's point, then, is that public ownership is a necessary
antecedent to appropriative rights. Were unappropriated water not
owned by the public, an appropriation would constitute a trespass
against the non-public owner. But, because water in its natural state
belongs to all, it is available to each to be put to beneficial use.
This explanation, however, raises further questions about the legal
origin of public ownership. If prior appropriation law. necessarily
entails public ownership, and that law predates the 1903 irrigation bill,
then what is the source of that law? Is it merely common law, subject
to

legislative

modification?

Moreover, is

public ownership

so

inextricably linked to prior appropriation doctrine that public
ownership cannot be removed without changing prior appropriation
itself? Because the Utah Constitution does not expressly guarantee
that prior appropriation will be the system of water appropriation, the
Utah legislature could presumably do away with prior appropriation,
subject to existing vested rights. However, even if the Utah legislature
could not do away with prior appropriation altogether, could it
nevertheless define the contours of public ownership as long as the
definition is consistent with prior appropriation? Arguably, this is
exactly what the legislature did in passing HB 141.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll existing rights to the
use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."o'

The irrigation

article, as it was known,'o is unique among water amendments to
western states' constitutions because it does not -expressly provide for

public ownership of water.' 7 Understanding the meaning of this
provision, which on its face protects the water rights status quo at the
time of statehood, requires a careful analysis of Utah's constitutional
history.os
104. Id.
105. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
106. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
107. CompareUTAH CONsT. art. XVII, § 1, with COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5, and IDAHO
CONST. art. XV, § 1, and Wyo. CONsT. art. VIII § 3. The Utah Constitution is unique
among western states' constitutions also because it does not clearly guarantee that

prior appropriation will govern water supply management.
108. See Am. Bush v. S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2006) (citing Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (explaining that
the constitution "is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols
of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed
them"):
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It took nearly half of a century of effort and at least seven
constitutional drafts for Utah to achieve statehood. The final, 1895
constitution followed "an eclectic model," drawing on "numerous"
sources, including previous draft Utah constitutions and the
constitutions of many other states, including Washington, Idaho,
Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming.os Because the 1895 convention
delegates were able to rely so extensively on the work of both previous
Utah conventions and the drafters of others states' constitutions, the
convention involved little serious debate."'
Yet, the text proposed for Utah Constitution article XVII
generated noteworthy discussion. The first proposal for a water
amendment to the 1895 Utah Constitution borrowed, essentially
verbatim, from the Wyoming Constitution and included a declaration
that all waters in the state are the property of the state."' Utah citizens
feared that in declaring state ownership of water, the amendment
would eliminate vested private rights to appropriate and use water.'
The subcommittee that proposed the text tried to clarify the
misunderstanding, explaining that the text did not intend to eradicate
existing usage rights and that the amendment included an express
protection of those rights."' The commission went forward with the
original text, which declared state ownership and protected existing
rights, submitting it to the constitutional convention."' But public
fear and confusion persisted, and the convention eventually rejected
the proposed text. Instead, the drafters provided only the following
vague, constitutional mandate on water: "All existing rights to the use
of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose,
are hereby recognized and confirmed."'
This piece of history could mean that the Utah Constitution does
not provide for public ownership of water. That conclusion, however,
reasons too far from the facts. At most, article XVII is ambiguous with
respect to public ownership, for it neither affirms- nor denies it. The
rejection of the Wyoming public ownership text does not fully
elucidate the meaning of article XVII, for it proves only that the
adopted text intended to clarify that vested appropriation rights would
109. Thomas G. Alexander, Utah's Constitution:A Reflection on the TerritorialExperience,
64 UTAH HIST. Q. 264 (1996).
110. John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government - The History of Utah's
Constitution, UTAH L. REv. 311, 323 (1966).
Of notable contention among the
delegates, however, was the issue of seating arrangements. Stanley S. Ivins, A
Constitutionfor Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 95, 101 (1957). A serious issue that received
considerable, heated debate was women's suffrage. Work of the Committees: Elections and
Suffrage Clauses - IrigationQuestions, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 14, 1895, at 5.
111. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
112. See id.; see also Confiscation of Water: Cache County Farmers Utterly Opposed to It, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Mar. 12, 1896, at 5. Even the full committee was uncertain of the meaning
of a declaration of public ownership. See Work of the Committees, supranote 110.
113. The Irrigation Article, sitpra note 76, at 11; Farmers Need Not Be Alarmed, DESERET
NEWS, Mar. 30, 1895, at 8.
114. See Irrigationin the Constitution, DESERET NEws, Apr. 6, 1895, at 11.
115. UTAH CONEr. art. XVII, § 1.
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not be confiscated. The most persuasive reading of article XVII, which
gives a plain meaning to its text," 6 is that the article merely reaffirms
the status quo with respect to ownership of water. Interpreting the
water provision requires, thus, analyzing not only the text rejected
from the irrigation article, but also the status quo, which the language
of the constitution reaffirms. From this analysis, it becomes clear that
the water management status quo at the time of statehood included a
general understanding of public ownership of water accompanied by
usufructuary rights to the use thereof.
The 1895 constitution was very much a product of the historical
experience of early Utahns,"7 and in that history we find some of the
meaning the drafters intended to attribute to the irrigation article.
Irrigation began in Utah at the pioneer camps on City Creek."" The
pioneers recognized that "[i] n an arid land water is natural wealth
essential to the existence of every human being.""' Accordingly, small
appropriations of water were the rule of irrigation,' with each person
"entitled to so much of it as he may apply to a beneficial use, but not a
single drop [more].""' The Utah District Law of 1865 is the first law
regulating Utah water, representing the transition from a common law
rule of capture to a regulated system of administration. 2 Utah water
law remained publicly oriented, emphasizing community control,
rights, and interests throughout territorial times.12 1
As one authority remarked, "the way water law developed in the
Territory of Utah was unique in the West."' 2 Utah water law strongly
emphasized community interests and public ownership.2 2 Evidencing
this originality, Brigham Young famously pronounced in 1848 - a
year before the drafting of Utah's first constitution - that "[t]here
shall be no private ownership of the streams that come out of the
canyons, nor the timber that grows in the hills. These belong to the
116. See, e.g., Am. Bush v. S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2006) (explaining
that constitutional interpretation begins with the "plain meaning" of the text).
117. See Alexander, supra note 109, at 281.
118. See ORSON F. WHITNEY, POPULAR HISTORY OF UTAH 547 (1916); see also Smythe,
supra note 80.
119. Smythe, supra note 80, at 186.
120. WHITNEY, supra note 118, at 547-48.
121. Smythe, supra note 80, at 186.
122. See CHARLES H. BROUGH, THE EcoNOMIc HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN UTAH 148,
Brough observed that under the regulated system "water is the
150-51 (1898).
common property of all the people." Id. at 148. He traced this concept to Justinian
law, and concluded that public ownership is the foundational principle of water rights
regulation. Id. at 160.
123.

See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURcES 328 (4th ed.

2006); see also Robert Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part , 5J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
165, 167 (1984); Howard R. Lamar, Statehood for Utah: A Different Path, 39 UTAH HIST.
Q. 307, 310 (1971) (emphasizing the communitarian nature of early Utah social
norms).
124. Swenson, supra note 123, at 166.
125.

See LEONARDJ. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIc HISTORY OF THE

LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900, at 52-53 (2004) (explaining how Mormon stewardship
principles directed natural resource management).
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people: all the people."'12
Young's proclamation indicates an
emphasis on community values and an orientation toward natural law
permeating early Utah society.127
Although Utah's communal treatment of water was exceptional,
Utah's founders' strong orientation to natural law was typical of legal
thinkers of the time. As one scholar noted, Utah was founded on the
idea that sovereignty derives "from natural rights consistent with
human intelligence and liberty."'12 Natural law arguments appear also
throughout the Utah Supreme Court's decisions on public ownership
of water. In Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., for
example, Justice Larson offered the following natural law explanation:
These waters are the gift of Providence: they belong to all as nature
placed them or made them available. They are the waters flowing in
natural channels or ponded in natural lakes and reservoirs. The title
thereto is not subject to private acquisition and barter, even by the
federal government or the state itself .. . no title to the corpus of the
water itself has been or can be granted, while it is naturally flowing,
any more than it can to the air or the winds or the sunshine. 29
In justesen v. Olsen the court followed similarly naturalistic
reasoning, stating "There can be no more ownership of water moving
through the soil than there can be of ownership of water moving
across the surface. It is evasive and constantly changing. In either case
any use must of necessity be in its nature usufructory [sic] only." 30
This orientation toward the public ownership of water has deep legal
roots, tracing its origin to early English common law and Blackstone,
who explained that "water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of
necessity continue common by law of nature; so that I can only have a
126. THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES 262 (2009); ARRINGTON, supra
note 125, at 52; ROBERT DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS INWESTERN WATERS 13 (1983).
Although many authors cite to this quotation, their investigations did not reveal its
location in the historical record. As one author also noted, while Brigham Young
always acknowledged the importance of public ownership of water, he and the early.
Deseret legislature regularly granted exclusive rights to private use. See Swenson, supra
note 123, at 166.
127. Brigham Young, however, was not the only leader to recognize the necessity of
public ownership of water in western states. President Theodore Roosevelt even said
that "[i] n the arid States the only right to which water should be recognized is that of
use." SAMUEL C. WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 63, at 125-26 (2d ed.
1908) (internal citation omitted). Also indicative of these attitudes is Monroe v. Ivie, 2
Utah 535 (Utah Terr. 1880), where the territorial court declared that "the lands are
open to all, and the appropriation of the water is open to all."
128. Alexander, supra note 109, at 270. Alexander notes that the 1862 constitutional
convention grounded its entire argument for statehood on the naturalistic ideal of
self-rule as an "unquestioned right." Id.
129. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah
1937).
130. Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935); see also Riordan v. Westwood,
203 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 1949). Both of these cases were overruled on other grounds.
See Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 247 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1952) (explaining
that a statutory provision for prior appropriation superseded the holdings of justesen
and Riordanwith respect to correlative groundwater rights).
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Although
temporary, transient, usufuctuary, property therein.""'
Blackstone's reasoning can be applied to all water allocation systems,
including the riparian systems of the eastern United States, it appears
frequently as a component of water law in western prior appropriation
states,132 where scarcity necessitates limits to the private control of
water.
The framers of the Utah constitution reaffirmed this orientation
towards natural law and cultural understanding of public ownership in
article XVII. The plain language of article XVII reaffirms the water
rights and ownership status quo at the time of statehood, recognizing
and confirming "[a] 11 existing rights to the use of any of the waters in
this State for any useful or beneficial purpose."13 3 It is difficult to
conceptualize how Utah's founders could have understood this
reaffirmation of the prior appropriation system without the widely
understood principle of public ownership that had always inhered in
Utah water law. The Utah Supreme Court has rightly recognized this
fact before, explaining that the "right of the public, as well as the
rights of the appropriator, were confirmed by the State Constitution in
article 17.""' This reading of article XVII finds support both in
precedent and in the breadth of historical authority. And, this
confirmation of public rights in article XVII may be the independent
and alternative basis for public ownership of Utah's waters.
Opponents can argue, however, that Utah Constitution article
XVII says nothing about public ownership of water. The framers'
rejection of the proposed public ownership text provides noteworthy
support for this position. Even so, substantial evidence suggests that
the irrigation amendment may in fact entail some notion of public
ownership, if only as a condition of the prior appropriation system of
water management. In either case, the question is constitutional and
therefore appropriate for judicial inquiry.
* -

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF.HB 141

The possibility of a constitutional foundation for public ownership
of water raises questions concerning the validity of HB 141. The Utah
Constitution establishes tripartite government, dividing powers among
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and provides that "no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others.""' Accordingly, the judicial power is vested in the

131. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18. The Utah
Supreme Court recited Blackstone's language essentially verbatim in Adams. 72 P.2d
at 653. See also In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846, 852 (Utah 1954) (Ellett,
J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont.
1933); Van Sickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 1872 WL 3542, at *5.
133. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
134. Adams, 72 P.2d at 653.
135. UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1.
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3
and the legislative power is vested in the Senate, the
Supreme Court,'1
House of Representatives, and the people of Utah.'13 By mandating
separation of powers and vesting the judicial power solely in the
courts, the Utah Constitution "preserves the sanctity of the judiciary
and helps to ensure that the rule of law, and not political partisanship
or transient majoritarian preferences, shall govern in our courts."'
The judicial power includes the authority to hear and determine
controversies arising between adverse parties, 39 as well as exclusive
jurisdiction to interpret the constitution.140 As ultimate arbiter of the
constitution, the Utah Supreme Court holds the power to invalidate
legislation defying the constitution, including legislative acts that
violate the separation of powers."'
HB 141 purports to interpret article XVII, asserting that public
ownership of water is purely statutory, even though both constitutional
history and Utah Supreme Court precedent suggest a different
The Act states in relevant part that "general
understanding.
constitutional and statutory provisions declaring public ownership of
water and recognizing existing rights of use are insufficient to
overcome the specific constitutional protections for private property
and do not justify inviting widespread unauthorized invasion of private
Interpreting the meaning of
property for recreation purposes."' 4
article XVII and its relationship with the Utah Constitution's
protections for private property is the province not of the Utah House
of Representatives, Senate, or Governor, but of the Utah Supreme
Court. In attempting to call into question the legal bases of f.J.N.P.,"'
which relied in part for its decision on the doctrine of public
ownership, HB 141 may intrude upon the judiciary's exclusive
authority to interpret the constitution, violating the separation of
powers commanded by Utah Constitution article V.
But, the separation of powers analysis may also be more nuanced,
if article XVII provides only a very basic protection for public
ownership of water. In such a case, it remains open to discussion
whether the constitutional separation of powers requires that the
responsibility for defining the contours of public ownership rest solely
with the Utah courts, or if instead the Utah legislature may also act in
this arena, so long as the judiciary ensures retention of the ultimate
nature of public ownership.

136. See id. art. VIII, § 1.
137. See id. art. VI, § 1(1).
138. In re Young, 976 P.2d 581, 602 (Utah 1999).
139. See Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water, 690 P.2d
562, 569 (Utah 1984).
140. See, e.g., Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378, 390 (Utah 1970).
141. See id. (invaliding legislation on separation of powers grounds).
142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(2) (2010).
143. See id. § 73-29-103(3).
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CONCLUSION

Drawing the line separating private property from public rights is
always controversial, as Utah's stream wars make evident. The
controversial and potentially unsettling nature of dividing public from
private is likely the reason that courts have shied away from navigability
in fact claims,'" which could convert property that riparian owners
have long believed to be private into public ownership. Instead, courts
have preferred public recreational easements as an alternate way to
resolve these public access cases. The story of Conatser and HB 141
makes clear that even recreational rights can have unsettling,
controversial effects, and that courts might create more enduring
certainty by addressing, rather than dodging, navigability claims.
Which branch of Utah government ultimately has the power to
decide the nature and extent to which recreational rights inhere in
Utah water law is uncertain. If public ownership is purely statutory,
then HB 141 should withstand a separation of powers challenge based
on article XVII. However, if public ownership is rooted in the Utah
Constitution, as Utah precedent and constitutional history suggest,
then the Utah Public Waters Access Act raises serious and challenging
constitutional separation of powers concerns.

144. In J.J.N.P., for example, the state asserted a navigability claim, which the court
set aside with little explanation even though a finding of navigability would have
disposed of the case. See 655 P.2d at 1136. See also Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 14344 (Wyo. 1961) (refusing to address navigability claims).

